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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 




BRAD EDWARDS and 
BRANDON GEARY, 
Defendant/Appellant 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
# # # # # # # 
AUTHORITY CONFERRING JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated as 
amended. This case is subject to transfer to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4) and Section 78-28-3(2) (j ) of the Utah 
Code Annotated as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The District Court committed error in granting a Summary 
Judgment to the plaintiff when there were material issues of fact 
to be determined at the time of trial. 
The District Court committed error in ruling that the plea of 
guilty entered by Brad Edwards to aggravated assault was conclusive 
as to whether or not Brad Edwards committed an intentional act and 
1 
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* 
that even if Brad Edwards did not intend to hit Brandon Geary, he 
could have expected the results. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Upon review of a grant of a Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Court of Appeals applies the same standard as that applied by the 
trial court. The appellate court must review the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the losing party, and affirm only where it 
appears that there is no genuine dispute as to any material issue 
of fact or where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. The Court of Appeals has a right to review the 
Conclusions of Law for correctness without according deference to 
the trial court's legal conclusions. Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 
281 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 
P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); and Daniels v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n, 771 P.2d 1100 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
DIMINUTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION STATUTES, ORDINANCES OR RULES 
Section 76-5-102(1)(c) 
(1) Assault is; 
(c) An act, committed without unlawful force or 
violence, that causes or creates a substantial risk of 
bodily injury to another. 
Section 76-5-103(1)(b) 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits 
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(b) Used a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601 or other means of force likely to produce death 
or serious bodily injury. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
This appeal is from a final Order of Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
granting the plaintiff/respondentfs Motion for Summary Judgment in 
an action to determine insurance coverage for the acts of Brad 
Edwards. 
B. Course of Proceedings: 
On about the 17th day of September, 1990, the 
plaintiff/respondent, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 
hereinafter referred to as State Farm, filed a Complaint in this 
action naming Brad Edwards and the appellant, hereinafter referred 
to as Brandon Geary, as defendants. The insurance company sought 
a ruling from the court that it was not financially responsible for 
the actions of Brad Edwards who was covered under a home owner's 
insurance policy. Brandon Geary filed an Answer to the Complaint. 
Brad Edwards was not represented by an attorney and did not file 
an Answer to the Complaint. On the 18th day of April, 1991, 
Brandon Geary filed a Motion to Intervene on behalf of Brad Edwards 
with a supporting Memorandum and a Request for Oral Argument. The 
court did not rule on Brandon Geary's Motion to Intervene and a 
default was not entered against Brad Edwards. State Farm filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment with a supporting Memorandum. Brandon 
Geary filed a Responsive Memorandum and the matter was argued 
before the District Court on the 7th day of July, 1992, before 
Judge Douglas Cornaby, Judge Cornaby granted the State Farm's 
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Motion for Summary Judgment and entered a Memorandum Decision on 
July 8, 1992. An Order granting summary judgment was signed by 
Judge Cornaby in this matter on the 8th day of July, 1992, and 
filed with the court on the 22nd day of July, 1992. 
Brandon Geary filed an appeal in this matter on the 21st day 
of August, 1992. On November 2, 1992, the Supreme Court entered 
an Order transferring this case to the Court of Appeals for a 
disposition. 
C. Disposition of Trial Court: 
Judge Douglas Cornaby granted State Farm's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, finding that Brad Edwards' actions were intentional and 
therefore excluded from the home owner's policy. 
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES. 
The plaintiff/respondent, State Farm Fire and Casualty 
Company, shall hereinafter be referred to as State Farm. The 
defendant/appellant, Brandon Geary, shall hereinafter be referred 
to as Brandon Geary. The defendant Brad Edwards is not a party to 
this appeal and will be referred to as Brad Edwards. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about the 4th day of September, 1989, Brad Edwards 
discharged a loaded shotgun in the direction of Brandon Geary, 
striking him in the chest and upper body. 
2. Brad Edwards was charged by the State of Utah with 
attempted homicide and entered into a plea negotiation with the 
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State of Utah whereby he plead guilty to an aggravated assault, a 
third degree felony. 
3. On the 24th day of January, 1990, Brad Edwards entered 
a plea of guilty to aggravated assault and signed a "Statement by 
Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty", a copy of which is 
attached in the Addendum hereto. At the time Brad Edwards entered 
his plea, he represented in open court that he did not 
intentionally shot Brandon Geary, but intended to scare him by 
shooting in close proximity to him and accidentally struck him with 
the shot. Brad Edwards stated: ff. . . I told him I am pleading 
guilty to the aggravated assault, but I didn't do it on purpose. 
I was not pleading guilty to shooting him on purpose. I was taking 
the best choice." (Deposition of Brad Edwards, Pg. 39, L. 1-14). 
4. Brandon Geary filed a lawsuit against Brad Edwards in the 
Davis County District Court on or about the 8th day of May, 1990, 
identified as Civil No. 900747669 PI. 
5. On or about the 17th day of September, 1990, the 
plaintiff filed a Complaint in this action naming Brad Edwards and 
Brandon Geary as defendants. Brandon Geary filed an Answer to the 
Complaint. Brad Edwards was not represented by counsel. Brad 
Edwards was provided an attorney by State Farm Insurance Company 
in the civil case referred to in Paragraph 4 hereof. However, said 
attorney did not file an answer in this action on behalf of Brad 
Edwards. 
6. Brandon Geary filed a Motion to Intervene on behalf of 
Brad Edwards on the 18th day of April, 1991, with a supporting 
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Memorandum. To this date there has been no ruling on the Motion 
to Intervene and the defendant has not been given the opportunity 
to argue the Motion to Intervene. 
7. After having received Memoranda and hearing argument in 
this case, Judge Douglas L. Cornaby, on July 8, 1992, granted State 
Farm's Motion for a Summary Judgment and entered a "Ruling on 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Conclusions and Decree", a copy of 
which is included in the Addendum hereto. 
8. A jury trial was held in the case of Brandon Geary v. 
Brad Edwards, Civil No. 900747669 PI before Judge Jon M. Memmott 
on the 21st day of October, 1992. At the conclusion of the trial, 
Judge Memmott granted Brad Edwards' Motion to dismiss Brandon 
Geary's cause of action for an intentional tort. The issue of 
negligence was submitted to the jury and they returned a verdict 
finding that Brad Edwards was negligent and that his negligence 
constituted 90 percent of the fault. A copy of the jury verdict 
is enclosed in the Addendum hereto. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. A summary judgment should not be granted if there is any 
genuine issue as to any material fact. There are issues of 
disputed fact in this case; and, therefore, the court committed 
error in granting a summary judgment. 
2. The court committed error in concluding that Brad Edwards 
intended to shoot and/or injure Brandon Geary because of a plea 
Brad Edwards entered to an aggravated assault charge. Aggravated 
6 
assault can consist of using force which creates a substantial risk 
of bodily injury. Brad Edwards testified that he did not intend 
to shoot or harm Brandon Geary; therefore, an issue of fact existed 
which should have been submitted to the trier of fact. 
3. Brad Edwards testified that he did not intend to shoot 
and did not expect or intend to injure Brandon Geary, The trial 
court committed error in ruling that Brad Edwards could have 
expected the results because he intentionally picked up the gun, 
pointed it, and fired it. An exclusion clause in an insurance 
policy should be construed against the insurance company and the 
company has the burden of demonstrating that Brad Edwards intended 
to shoot and expected or intended to injure Brandon Geary. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STANDARD OF PROOF 
Under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on a 
summary judgment motion the plaintiff has the burden of proving to 
the trial court that no genuine issue as to any material fact 
exists and that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law. Frisbee v. Kay & Kay Construction Co,, 676 P.2d 384 (Utah 
1984). Furthermore, a motion for summary judgment must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Reliable 
Furniture Co. v. Fidelity S Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, 398 
P.2d 685 (Utah 1965). Finally, courts should be reluctant to 
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invoke the remedy of summary judgment. Brandt v. Springville 
Banking Co., 353 P.2d 460 (Utah 1960). 
The appellant alleges that there was a material issue of fact 
as to whether or not Brad Edwards intended to shoot the appellant 
and whether or not Brad Edwards' actions could be expected to cause 
bodily injury to the appellant. The evidence presented before the 
trial court in the form of a deposition taken of Brad Edwards 
clearly raised disputed issues of fact which had to be viewed in 
a light most favorable to the appellant. Consequently, the court 
committed error in granting a summary judgment and denying the 
appellant an opportunity for a trial on those issues. 
POINT II 
BRAD EDWARDS1 PLEA OF GUILTY TO AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
WAS NOT DETERMINATIVE OF THE ISSUE OF INTENT. 
State Farm, in its motion before the District Court, argued 
that the District Court should assume that Brad Edwards shot 
Brandon Geary intentionally because of the plea he entered to 
aggravated assault. Judge Douglas Cornaby, in his Memorandum 
Decision granting summary judgment, stated: "Mr. Edwards plead 
guilty to intentionally injuring Mr. Geary. He cannot now explain 
away that plea." (Pg 1, "Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Conclusions, and Decree"). Brad Edwards was originally charged 
with attempted homicide, a second degree felony. That plea was 
negotiated down to a charge of aggravated assault, a third degree 
felony. On the 24th day of January, 1990, Brad Edwards entered a 
plea to the aggravated assault and signed a "Statement by Defendant 
8 
j i i Advance of Plea", a copy of which is enclosed Li i the Addendum, 
hereto. 
B r a d E d i / a r d s, I i 1 1 1 i s d e p o s i t i c i i
 lf 1: a s t i f i a d 11 i a t 1: i • a p • 1 a a d 
g u i l t y t o tl le r e d u c e c h a r g e n o t b e c a u s e he i n t e n d e d t o s h o o t 
Brandon Geary 1ml b e c a u s e ho t houqh t i f wis t h e benl o p t i o n 
a v a i l a b l e tu linn Mi il IhJuaid
 J( t e s t i f i e d tha i he h I J I the Judge 
..11 line t ime lie e n t e r e d I lie? [i lea tha t tie dJiJ not I n t e n d ro shoot 
Brandon Homy ' n l | ' ' ' M M^ ' ' , l" ,Jt"ateroen I I In |II<II|H arc epfedi h n 
p l e a l o t h e l e s s o r o l f e n s e o i a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l l , Brad Ldwaids , 
* t h e t i m e of s e n t e n c i n g , ai jatn t o l d t h e judge t h a t he d id not 
1 • - "' • < 1 s I 
, . * . . . * - . Page 39 
'i -id Edwa: is* depi ?*: t :, *: i.t* stated: 
;at' s c^neL'. ...._.
 t , uuuj,.^ 
. *2 to the aggravated assault b-j'_ i didn't 
do it on purpose. 1 wasn't pleading guilty to 
shooting him on p\irpf<^>* r v;as taking the ^ **c** 
choice. 
t l in =; 1 J t a l l ! I"" Il iiiiinn,ilim-ii I - : •>- . • s a s . i - iiiiii 1 I  
as: 
! I ) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, 
I do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or 
violence, that causes or creates a substantial risk of 
"bodily in j ury to another • 
Section 76-5-103 of the otah Code Anno tate J ; • 
assa/i ill t: as: 
(-1 ) A person commits aggr avated assault: if he commi ts 
assault as defined in Secti on 76- 5-3 02 and he: 
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(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to 
another; or 
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce death 
or serious bodily injury. 
Under Utah State Law in effect at the time Brad Edwards 
entered his plea of guilty, he could be guilty of an aggravated 
assault if he committed an act with unlawful force or violence that 
causes or created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
The State law did not require that Brad Edwards intend to cause 
bodily injury to another. Paragraph 4 of the "Statement by 
Defendant in Advance of Plea" signed by Brad Edwards states that 
the elements of the statements prove are: 
(1) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; and 
(b) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to 
another. 
The elements quoted above could constitute the act of 
aggravated assault. However, the defendant could be guilty of 
aggravated assault if he created a substantial risk of bodily 
injury to another. Brad Edwards, after signing the statement, told 
the trial court that he did not intend to shoot or hit Brandon 
Geary. After receiving that explanation from Brad Edwards, not 
withstanding the language of the "Statement", the trial court 
accepted his plea to the aggravated assault. This was clearly 
permissible by the court since Brad Edwards could be found guilty 
of the crime even if he did not intend to shoot or hit Brandon 
Geary. Therefore, it is inappropriate for Judge Cornaby to 
conclude that the plea of guilty entered by Brad Edwards was 
conclusive as to the issue of his intent, and that Brad Edwards 
10 
c o u l - i ^\r ,-^ w.v; Msat c . ^ . : . - /;:«.. 3by " a c no way of 
„ , i \l I I 'M) I III1! I I 
B r a d Kdvvard*" c o u l d no ^ u : ; ' v "- a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t e v e n thoug l ) h e 
may * ->-*v* " t p r i d p r i * **' * -nd ru h i * FIT ^ r.rion ^ - a r v . 
• 1 
1 1 t ; : 1 , n», 1 I T , ; i | 11 i \ jj MI i i n • I h ' I * * 
t r a n s c r i p t o ! t h e p r o c e e d i n g s l e l d b e f o r e Jmdqe P a g e wlmn HI ail 
E d w a r d s e n t e r e d h i ? p i n t hull' in P a g e f s c o u r t r e p o r t e r , H.U R e e s , 
d i e d O'l; c a n c e r , olhei i r u m I i n p n i l n i ' i u JIII«I mil .ihlh» I IIIM i | i l im 
h i s n o t e s s o a s t o p r o d u c e s u c h a t r a n s c r i p t . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e 
o n l y e v l d e r i c o t h a t J u d q o r o r n a b y h a d was t h e s t a t e m e n t by ( h e 
d e f e i i d a n t r e f e r r e d h i hu 1 e l n in I ll iu iin|.ni-»M IIMUI MI hi rid 1'iiwmilH 
POINT I I 1 
BRAD EDWARDS DID NOT INTENTIONALLY SHOT BRANDON GEARY 
AND DID NOT EXPECT OR INTEND THAT BRANDON GEARY BE INJURED 
BY THE SHOTGUN BLAST. 
The sole basir k -r State Farm's .MotJ on for Summary • Judgment 
was an allegation that Brad Edwards J 1 itentional I.y sho t: Brandon 
Geary. The openii ig paragraph of State Far mfs memorandum ii 1 support 
Case law is clear in holding that an intentional shooting 
falls within the intentional injury exclusion clause of 
insurance policies In the present: case, Brad Edwards 
has admitted he intentionally shot Brandon Geary. 
Therefore, Brad Edwards' actions are not covered by his 
parents1 homeowner's policy which contains an intentional 
injury exclusion clause• • • 
Brad E d w a r d s 1 actions and Intent are clearly set forth in his 
d e p o s l t. 1 0:1: B r a d E d w a r d s l o s t i I lleill I n I I Il II m | i, 1 || i i m . , 
first 1111 e he fired a warning shot : a: <-• * Brandon Ge a r y , 
aiming the shot at the ground. In this regard Brad Edwards 
stated: 
Q. You then take the gun and do what with it? 
A. Point it out the window. Not at them, but at 
a direction, and I fired a warning shot to 
scare them off. 
Q. Where did you think the warning shot went? 
A. It went in the ground. 
(Deposition of Brad Edwards, P. 30, L. 4-8) 
A second shot was then fired. Regarding this shot, Brad Edwards 
stated: 
Q. Did you see him look over his rear shoulder? 
A. No, I didn't. And I shot another shot. 
Q. An what was your intent of that shot? 
A. To scare them away. 
Q. And where you aiming the shot? 
A. The same place. 
(Deposition of Brad Edwards, P. 31, L. 11-16) 
Brad Edwards was specifically asked if he intended to shot Brandon 
Geary. He stated: 
Q. So it was not your intent at the time that you 
actually struck Brandon to hit him? 
A. No, I was just trying to scare him like they 
were scaring me. . . . 
(Deposition of Brad Edwards, P. 35, L. 10-22) 
Q. . . . What I am going to ask you, at the time 
that you fired the shotgun that actually hit 
Brandon Geary, was it your intent to strike him 
with the pellets from the shotgun? 
A. No sir. 
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A . 
( D e p o s i t i c n * Hr 'id t JM a 'i 7) 
Brad Edward •: * ^ c + | f i o H t ^^ t -, • "^1 i^ve tha t : the 
S h O t Q l I n, I.J11 i..l J i I In J1' M i I ' . I i i 'Ci'' i <: ; i i • :::i i c i n i i y j i i ' « ' " » : :| i ^ ^ -lO. I ? W B L ]( • 
(Deposition of Brad Edwards, P 48 I 7 1 8). 
Cc I nisei! lor Ctate Pann questioned Brad Edwards and asked him 
whether he ii itentionally fired the gi in. Brad Edwar ds responded as 
follows: • • 
Ai id you ii iter ltioi :taJ ] y f I i: ed t:l: le Gi n l ? Whether 
yoi I tried to 1 :! HI them or i iot, you 
intentionally fired the g un; i s t:l lat correct? 
Intentionally J i: I another direction, yes, sir 
* Well, if I shot the gun, yeah, that's correct. 
1 aimed the gun out the window in an intention 
to scare them whlrh I shot the gun 
intentionally, but not lo hurt; to scare. 
(Deposition of Brad Edwards, P h 1 I 1^-25 I. 
i i in mi I  ro at a i Pii ionf" a I I I M M ill I I in in Ii "I I I , I I I HI II I I 1 W H I I I M I n 11 i s i lef I O S Ii t i n i n 
mi I'aqe 70, Line I I and Page /d( Lines ID thiough 15. 
Brandon i.nury II led a lawsuit against Brad Edwards on the 8th 
iT \ , i i f H a y , II " i nn 1 i|c
 u\ | r i n d ,i i ii ' I II iPI "HI HI ' 4"" fufi 'I III1 I I Il III Ill 
lawsuit Brandon Geary alleged that Brad Kdwaids was negligent In 
firing the shot gun in his direction and that * - negligpnc« 
llif* ( II ox I ina I (i IIHIMO oil Brandon ooaiy'^ ln||iiiy 
allnqnd that the acts of Hi ad Edwards were Intentional. A jury 
trial was held on thi^r matter on the 21st day nf Oetobei
 l( P'h'hi. 
Lludije Inn Mumniotl, t h e U i s L i i o i L o u i t .Judge, d i s m i s s e d B r a n d o n 
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Geary's action for an intentional tort at the conclusion of the 
evidence, upon a motion by Brandon Geary's attorney. The issue of 
negligence was submitted to= the jury, who concluded that Brad 
Edwards was negligent in his act and that his negligence 
constituted 90 percent of the fault. (A copy of the Jury Verdict 
is enclosed in the Addendum hereto). 
State Farm claims that liability coverage does not apply to 
bodily injury or property damage which "(1) which is either 
expected or intended by an insured or (2) any person or property 
which is the result of willful and malicious acts of the insured." 
Judge Cornaby ruled that the acts of Brad Edwards were excluded 
because: 
He intentionally picked up a loaded shot gun. He 
intentionally pointed it in the direction of Mr. Geary. 
He intentionally fired. The first shot missed. He 
intentionally fired a second shot which hit Mr. Geary . 
. . Even if Mr. Edwards had not 'intended' to hit Mr. 
Geary, he could have 'expected' that it would happen 
considering his intentional actions . . . . 
It is the position of Brandon Geary that Judge Cornaby erred 
in concluding that intentionally picking up a shot gun and firing 
it in the direction of Brandon Geary is sufficient to meet the 
language of the exclusion. The trial court had no evidence before 
it with the exception of the deposition of Brad Edwards and the 
"Statement by Defendant in Advance of Plea" previously referred to 
herein. Given the statements of Brad Edwards in his deposition, 
there was clearly an issue of fact as to whether or not Mr. Edwards 
intended to hit Mr. Geary and/or expected that his acts would 
injury Mr. Geary. 
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The exclusion clause rel led upon by State Farm, has been the 
Insurance Company v. McGratli I Wash. App, 1991 ) 1 1 le 
defendant and ;ic:tim were -*• altercatli - victim approached 
. • *,i r -iiTie the defendant 
:.. - the vie'. * **• .*-  - - :^;e. ,io . , ai.ned, tt lat he did i lot 
intend 1 : o i nji ire the victim, but only to prevent: the victim,1 s 
Ei' I v ai i„c: .e a,i :u :i I I: i s I : 1 HE • a s • >• : t: a I m i i l g • a t: I: 1 „ = I c t: „ i n: , 1 : \ I „ I „ I I = 
general directioi i Tl IB cour t stated that for I: he insurance pol icy 
exclusion, to apply, the J n jured must J ntend both the physJ cal act 
=i, id I : I: le i: e s i ill I: „ I i lg i i l j i o : ; ; I : 1: 1 JE „:i :: t i :nr T l xe :: • :: \ i i : t: sta ted: 
„ Lumbermen makes the same contention as to McGrath's 
testimony and affidavit; namely, that it establishes 
there is no factual issue as to McGrath's intent to 
injure Hayes. We disagree. The record contains the 
following statements, "I fired the gun in their direction 
to stop them, never intending to shot him or hit him or 
anything like that.1" "I did not expect to hit anybody." 
These statements, if believed, as we must on summary 
judgment, raise a material issue of fact as to McGrath's 
intent, regardless of other statements suggesting he d id 
intend to injure. We acknowledge that read as a whole 
McGrath's affidavit and testimony supports a compelling 
and persuasive argument that McGrath did, :l n fact, intend 
to injure. However, we are not the trier of the fact and 
we are unable to say that reasonable minds could not 
reach a different conclusion, and, hence, summary 
igment is inappropriate. 
r :\<s case of Allstate Insurance Company y. Steinemer, 7 23 
F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 198'l I a sunmiai Y ) udqnienl was ijrantoil In I he 
insurance company. The summary judgment was overturned by t ho 
Court: of Appeals. Two boys had been playing with a HH gun and one 
o f the boys was sho t: ai id I: : I 1:: ::! :i: i the ery e T h e • zlefendaml si 11 nd I I ill 
he i ntended be » h i b tl le v ictim w. I t:h the BB so tha t he could I eel 11 in 
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sting, but that he did not intend to harm him. The Court of 
Appeals found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether the insured intended to cause harm to the victim. The 
court stated: 
Under the majority rule the exclusion applies only if the 
insured intended to do a particular act, AND intended to 
do some harm, even if the harm actually done was 
radically different from that intended . . . On the 
other hand, . . . f an intentional injury' exclusion will 
not apply if the insured intentionally does an act, but 
has no intent to commit harm, even if the act involves 
foreseeable consequences of great harm or even amounts 
to gross or culpable negligence. Pg. 875. 
In Vanguard Insurance Company v. Cantrell, 503 P.2d 962 (Az. 
App. 1972), the court dealt with an insurance policy exclusion for 
expected or intended injuries. In that case, the defendant robbed 
a drive-up liquor store, and as he drove off he fired a shot over 
his shoulder in the direction of the store to scare the victim and 
to make him duck so that he would not recognize the defendant or 
the defendant's car. The shot struck the victim in his eye. The 
trial court found that the defendant had not intended to cause harm 
even though he intended the act of shooting; and that, therefore, 
the insurance policy exclusion did not apply and the insurance 
company was found liable under its home owner's policy. 
The case of Fire Insurance Exchange v. Berray, 694 P.2d 259 
(Az. App. 1983) involved an insurance policy which had an exclusion 
for intentional acts of the insured. Two parties were involved in 
an exchange of words and a fight. The defendant warned the victim 
not to come any closer, and when that warning was ignored, took a 
gun from his van and shot the victim. The Arizona Court held that 
16 
the exclusion 1 angi lage I n the i nsurance pol icy mi ist be construed 
I i favor of I: 1 le i i lsured ai id against t:l le insu i: ai ice company Till: „e 
cour t went on to state tl la t the insured tl le defendant , 
inten bionally caused harm to the victim \ j. 1 thii I the meani ng of the 
exclusion clause of tl le 1 lome owner f s poll i cy bi i t tl la t I: l e • ::i:i d :i i : I: 
commit an i ntentional act within the meaning of the exclusion 
i I ,HJ,1 ip where 1 : .e acted :l n self- defense. Tl le court revi ewed the case 
•i i)f Clark v. Allstate Insurance Company, \ i ? IP , Id 1 i LJli I h / \\up. 
1975) where one high school student struck another In the fare 
I [ :i jii ir i i: lg 1: :l iiii 'I I: le COT lr t si »il od I ha! i I" t IIH h 1 qln sehoo i student had 
all eged that the striking wass accidental and the blow itself was 
uni ntentional, then summary judgment would nut be appropriate since 
t h e i P wuuih i In i 'M hni>ru ii in - * I c^  r I «i I f u I ho I I H r int p r m i n f d .nl I T i ill 
II seeiiLi c l n a r troin t h e c a s e s c i t e d t h a t >n e x c l u s i o n a r y 
c l a u s e in an i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y i s t o he c o n s t r u e d in favoi of t h e 
I i i s ii 1 1 i » 1 1 11 n 11 I I in i I I 1 1 1 1 1 i mi 1111" I 1 1 1 • mi in 11 I I I ". i 1 1 1 i • III I • v , in i p K i I  I I I  I in I I in 11 I  in in II 
of the Insui ed to commit an <ti t .mil Lo cau.se an injuiy by I he 
commission of that act, Brad Edwards ha«i testified that he fired 
I j O L " i tJSC I IH W I . I I M I 1 III I II I I II II Il l IWIIIII » ,,) I IM I \ I I I I I I 1 1 I I liliM- I I 1 I I 1 M I ! 
intend to hit Brandon Geary m to injure him. Consequently, thei e 
Is a material issue of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. 
CONCLUSION 
The t r i a l c o u r t commit ted e r r o r i n njin i n t l n q S t a t e F i n n ' s 
Mo Lion for Summary .1 <l< iiiiticrnt , The re was a m a t e r i a l I s s u e o i fact; 
a s t o whe the r or. n o t Brad Edwards i n t e n d e d t o s h o o t a t , s t r i k e , 
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and/or injure Brandon Geary. The trial court could not conclude 
as a matter of law from Brad Edwards plea to aggravated assault 
that he intended to shoot Brandon Geary and/or injure him. 
Likewise, the court committed error in concluding that even if Brad 
Edwards did not intend to hit Brandon Geary, he could have 
"expected" the results. 
Under Utah Law, aggravated assault can consist of using 
unlawful force which causes a substantial risk of injury. An 
exclusion clause in a homeowner's policy should be construed in 
favor of the insured and the insurance company should have the 
burden of proving that Brad Edwards intended to shoot Brandon Geary 
and to injure him. Since the evidence before the court clearly 
raised a factual issue as to whether Brad Edwards intended to shoot 
Brandon Geary and/or intended to injure him, summary judgment was 
not appropriate. 
Wherefore, Brandon Geary respectfully requests that the 
summary judgment be reversed and the matter remanded back to the 
District Court for a trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this f day of December, 1992. 
ROBERT A. ECHAfcD 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify four (4) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mailed, postage prepaid, this <jf"~ 
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A t t o r n e y s f o r R e s p o n d a n t , P n Box 2 9 7 0 , S a l t Lake C i t y , l)T 8 4 1 1 0 -
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT JUL 09 1992 
IN AND FOR THE LjllLb^UU Lj LZ 
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRAD EDWARDS, et al., 
Defendants. 
CO. , 
) RULING ON MOTION FOR 
| SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I CONCLUSIONS, AND DECREE 
| Civil No. 920700021 
The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was before the 
Court for oral argument. The plaintiff's position was argued by 
Daniel D. Anderson and the defendants' position was argued by 
Robert A. Echard. After oral argument the Court took the motion 
under advisement. 
The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted. 
The defendant is attempting to collect through a homeowners 
insurance policy. The policy has an intentional act exclusion. 
The defendant, Brad Edwards, plead guilty to a negotiated 
charge of aggravated assault and was sentenced to the Utah State 
Prison. He signed a "statement by defendant in advance of plea 
of guilty." The elements of aggravated assault were detailed 
therein, to-wit, "(1) An attempt, with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another; and (b) Intentionally 
causes serious bodily injury to another.11 He was represented by 
an attorney. He now says in his deposition that he only 
intended to scare the other party away. In fact, he pointed a 
shotgun and fired in the direction of Brandon N. Geary who was 
hit in the face, neck, and chest with 132 pellets. 
Mr. Edwards plead guilty to intentionally injuring Mr. 
Geary. He cannot now explain away that plea. 
Even if the fact finder believed that Mr. Edwards did not 
intend to injure Mr. Geary, the acts of Mr. Edwards were 
intentional. He intentionally picked up a loaded shotgun. He 
intentionally pointed it in the direction of Mr. Geary. He 
intentionally fired. The first shot missed. He intentionally 
fired a second shot which hit Mr. Geary. 
The insurance policy provides that "medicals do not apply 
to...bodily injury...which is either expected or 
intended...or...which is the result of willful and malicious 
acts of an insured...11 
Even if Mr. Edwards had not "intended" to hit Mr. Geary, he 
could have "expected" that it would happen considering his 
intentional actions. 
The plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment in its 
declaratory judgment action. 
The plaintiff is directed to draw a formal order consistent 
with this ruling. 
Dated July 8, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to: 
Lowell V. Smith Robert A. Echard 
Daniel D. Andersen Key Bank Bldg., Suite 200 
P. O. Box 2970 2491 Washington Blvd. 
SLC, UT 84110-2970 Ogden, UT 84401 
Dated this %Ul day of July 1992. 
Deputy q^erk 
Lowell V. Smith, #3006 
Daniel D. Andersen, #5907 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
(801) 363-7611 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE FARM FIRE AND 
CASUALTY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, : ORDER 
v. : 
BRAD EDWARDS and : Civil No: 920700021 CV 
BRANDON N. GEARY, : 
: Judge Douglas Cornaby 
Defendants. : 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment came before this 
Court for oral argument on July 7, 1992. Plaintiff was represented 
by its attorneys Lowell V. Smith and Daniel D. Andersen. 
Defendant, Brandon N. Geary, was represented by his attorney Robert 
A. Echard. Defendant Brad Edwards did not appear either through 
counsel nor in person. Oral argument was presented to the Court. 
The Court took the Motion under advisement. 
Based on the memoranda of law submitted by the parties 
and on the oral argument, and being fully advised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted; 
JUL d i\ 29 lYi '32 
BY. * - " 
i)L:: Uf 
r\ A A f\ n i ft 
2. The acts of Brad Edwards are found to fall within 
the exclusionary coverage of the homeowner's policy 
which states: 
Coverage L [Personal Liability] and Coverage M 
[Medical Payments to Others] to not apply to: 
A. Bodily injury or property damage: 
(1) Which is either expected or 
intended by an insured; or 
(2) To any person or property which 
is the result of willful and 
malicious acts of an insured. 
3. Plaintiff, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 
owes no duty of indemnification for the acts of Brad Edwards and 
the claims of Brandon N. Geary, as set forth in the underlying 
action, Geary v. Edwards, Case No. 900747669 PI. 
4. Plaintiff, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 
owes no duty of defense to Brad Edwards in the underlying action, 
Geary v. Edwards, Case No. 900747669 PI. 
DATED this 22. day of July, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) M -
I Ti tr* tm . . . r ' 
A3 SUCH CLEFjtfV 
'•V SX/^TF v.---
LI M?rNESS ''W°/*A<-fo/\ID OFF.CE 
' 4 ^ P * U U CARR. CLElrfOV-
- 2 - BY:* 
^ P A U L A C A R . C L E R R ^ ' . ; : 
^ > f e — • • f f y - f -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered this 
l(r" day of July, 1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
to the following: 
Robert A. Echard 
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES 
Key Bank Building, Suite 200 
2491 Washington Blvd 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Defendant Geary 
-3-
KEVIN P. SULLIVAN (#3871) of 
FARR, KAUFMAN, HAMILTON, 
SULLIVAN, GORMAN & PERKINS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
205 26th Street, Suite 34 
Bamberger Square Building 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-5526 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
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STATEMENT BY DEFENDANT IN 
ADVANCE OF PLEA OF GUILTY 
Case No. 891706590 FS 
JUDGE: RODNEY S. PAGE 
I hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised 
of and that I understand the following facts and rights, and that 
I have had the assistance of counsel in reviewing, explaining, and 
completing this form: 
1. The nature of the charges against me have been 
explained. I have had an opportunity to discuss the nature of the 
charges with my attorney, and I understand the charges and the 
elements which the government is required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 




CLASS QR DEGREE 
2nd Degree 
STATUTORY PENALTY 
1-15; $10,000 an 
additional 0-5 years 
to run consecutively 
STATE OF UTAH V. EDWARDS - Case No. 891706590 
Statement in Advance of Plea 
3. It has been discussed with the prosecutor the 
possibility of entering a plea of guilty to the charges as 
follows: 
CRIME CLASS OR DEGREE STATUTORY PENALTY 
Aggravated Assault 3rd Degree 0-5; $5,000 
4. I understand that the elements of the offense the State 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt are: 
(1) An attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; and 
(b) Intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another. 
5. I know that I can be represented by an attorney at 
every stage of the proceeding, and I have retained the law firm of 
FARR, KAUFMAN, HAMILTON, SULLIVAN, GORMAN & PERKINS to represent 
me in this matter. 
6. I know that I have a right to plead "not guilty", and 
I know that if I do plead "not guilty", I can persist in that 
plea. 
7. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury, and that 
if I were to stand trial by a jury: 
(a) I have a right to the assistance of counsel at every 
stage of the proceeding. 
(15J 1 Rave a right" t*o see and observe the witnesses who 
testify against me. 
STATE OF UTAH V. EDWARDS - Case No. 891706590 
Statement in Advance of Plea 
(c) My attorney can cross-examine all witnesses who 
testify against me. 
(d) I can call such witnesses as I desire, and I can 
obtain subpoenas to require the attendance and testimony of 
those witnesses. 
(e) I cannot be forced to incriminate myself and I do not 
have to testify at any trial. 
(f) If I do not want to testify, the jury will be told 
that no inference adverse to me may be drawn from my 
failure to testify. 
(g) The government must prove each and every element of 
the offense(s) charged against me beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
(h) It requires a unanimous verdict of a jury to convict 
me. 
(i) If I were to be convicted, I can appeal, and if I 
cannot afford to appeal, the government will pay the costs 
of the appeal including the services of appointed counsel. 
8. I have discussed my constitutional rights to a jury 
trial with my attorney. I understand all the rights listed in 
paragraphs 7(a) through 7(i), and it is my desire to waive those 
r igh t s . 6- £> 
Defendant's I n i t i a l s 
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STATE OF UTAH V. EDWARDS - Case No. 8917 06590 
Statement in Advance of Plea 
9. Under a plea of guilty, there will not be a trial of 
any kind, and I am waiving my rights and admitting that I am 
guilty of the crime to which my plea is entered• 
10. I hereby acknowledge and waive the following rights: 
(a) I waive the right to have a jury trial. 
(b) I waive the right to see and observe the witnesses who 
testify against me. 
(c) I waive the right to have my attorney cross-examine 
the State witnesses. 
(d) I waive the right to put on a defense and call 
witnesses on my behalf, 
(e) I waive my right against self-incrimination and hereby 
admit that I am guilty to the charge. 
(f) I waive my right to make the State prove each and 
every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
(g) I waive my right to have a unanimous jury verdict to 
convict me. 
I have discussed my constitutional right to a jury trial 
with my attorney. I understand my rights, and hereby acknowledge 




STATE OF UTAH V. EDWARDS - Case No, 891706590 
Statement in Advance of Plea 
11. I understand that by pleading guilty that there is no 
appellate review of any lawful sentence imposed under a plea of 
guilty, 
12. No agreements have been reached, and no 
representations have been made to me as to what the sentence will 
be. 
I understand that sentencing is left to the judge, and that 
the State and defense cannot 'bargain concerning the sentence. 
Defendants initials 
13. I know that under the Laws of Utah, the possible 
maximum sentence that can and may be imposed upon my plea of 
guilty to the charge identified on page two of the agreement, are 
set out in paragraph three above. I also know that if I am on 
probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of 
which I have been convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my 
plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences 
being imposed upon me. 
14. I know that under a plea of guilty the Judge may ask 
me questions about the offense to which the plea is entered. 
15. The only plea agreement which has been entered into 
with the Government is: 
That the State will reduce the 2nd degree felony to a'3rd 
degree felony and dismiss the firearm enhancement. That 
the State will recommend no jail or prison and recommend 
that the Defendant be placed on probation. The State would 
5 
STATE OF UTAH V, EDWARDS - Case No. 891706590 
Statement in Advance of Plea 
further recommend that the Defendant be ordered into a 
counseling program which may be supervised by the District 
Court or Juvenile Court. The State would join with the 
Defendant in a motion for 4 02 treatment at time of 
sentencing. 
MAJOR 
attorney for Plaintiff 
STEVEN V. Defendant's Initials 
Attorney for I 
16. I have a right to ask the Court any questions I 
wish to ask concerning my rights, or about these proceeding and 
the plea. 
* * * * * * 
I make the following representations to the Court: 
1. I am fey years of age. My education consists of 
// tf&aAOJ . I C#st^
 read and 
(can - cannot) 
understand English. 
2. No threats or promises of any sort have been made to me 
to induce me or to persuade me to enter this plea. 
3. No one has told me that I would receive probation or 
any other form of leniency because of my plea. 
4. I have discussed the case and this plea with my lawyer 
as much as I wish to. 
5. I am satisfied with my lawyer. 
6. My decision to enter this plea was made after full and 
careful thought, with the advice of counsel, and with a full 
understanding of my rights, the facts and circumstances of the 
6 
STATE OF UTAH V. EDWARDS - Case No. 891706590 
Statement in Advance of Plea 
case and the consequences of the plea. I was' not under the 
influences of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants ^when the 
decision to enter the plea was made, and I am not now under the 
influences of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants. 
7. I have no mental reservations concerning the plea. 
DATED this £*f day of January, 1990. 
BRAD EDWARDS 
Defendant 
I certify that I have discussed this statement with the 
Defendant; that I have fully explained his/her rights to him/her 
and have assisted him/her in completing this form. I believe that 
he/she is knowingly and voluntarily entering the plea with full 
knowledge of his/her legal rights, and that there is a factual 
basis for the plea. 
DATED this day of January, 1990. 
KEVIN P. SULLIVAN 
Attorney for defendant 
O R D E R 
The signature of the Defendant was acknowledged in the 
presence of the undersigned Judge. 
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STATE OF UTAH V, EDWARDS - Case No. 891706590 
Statement in Advance of Plea 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement 
by Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty, the. Court finds the 
Defendant's plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it 
is ordered that Defendant's plea of "guilty" to the charge set 
forth in the agreement be accepted and entered. 
DONE in Court this <3H~^  day of January, 1990. 
>\V: STATEOFUTAH „ - ^ c r f - * ' 
COUNTY OF DAVIS 1 ^ VA'/
 v 
I THE UNOEFfST^vN^OT'tfLERK QP'THE DISTRICT 
COURT OF LTVi* COUNTY, UTAH-^O HEREBY CER-
TIFY r ^ r n i r r 'N^jso ANO FC^PPQING IS A Tnut 
AND FULL C::TN* G\- M 1 Ot* 10!M \i-DOCUMENT ON 
FILE IN IV:Y cr-w" .- -'»- ~! " < t j -^ *— 
FILED IM C*_~P>:'3 V j . v i r 
• UCT 30 i | 3S Pii ?32 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRANDON N. GEARY,, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
BRAD EDWARDS and, | 
CHRISTOPHER ORCHARD, ] 
Defendants. ] 
> SPECIAL VERDICT 
Case No. 900747669 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a 
preponderance of the evidence. If you find the evidence 
preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer "Yes.11 If 
you find the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot 
determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that 
the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer 
"No." Also, any damages assessed must be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
1. Was the defendant, Brad Edwards, negligent as alleged 
by plaintiff? 
Yes ^  No 
2. Was Brad Edward's negligence a proximate cause of the 
injuries sustained by the plaintiff? 
Yes Y No 
3. Was the defendant, Christopher Orchard, 
contributorily negligent? 
Yes /^ No 
4. Was Christopher Orchard's contributory negligence a 
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries? 
Yes J\ No 
5. Was the plaintiff, Brandon Geary, contributorily 
negligent, as alleged by the defendant? 
Y e s ^ No 
6. Was Brandon Geary's negligence approximate cause of 
plaintiff's injuries? 
7. Considering the fault of all the parties whom you 
have found to be responsible for this incident, what percentage 
of fault is attributable to each: 
A. Plaintiff (Brandon Geary) / % 
B. Defendant (Brad Edwards) 
C. Defendant (Christopher Orchard) J % 
TOTAL 100% 
8, If you have answered Questions 2 and 4, "Yes, state 
the amount of special and general damages, if any, sustained by 
the plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries. If such 
questions were not answered lfYes', do not answer this question. 
Special Damages: $. 
General Damages: 
TOTAL S 66,5:3?,?{ i 
DATED t h i s 23rd day of O c t o b e r , 19,92 
